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CASENOTES
Clarifying the Authority Delegated to the Secretary of State for the Con-
trol of Passports: Haig v. Agee' — Pursuant to the Passport Act of 1926, 2 the
Secretary of State of the United States is empowered to control the granting or
issuing of passports. 3 Since a challenge to the power of Congress to delegate
passport authority at all would probably fail, 4 past challenges to the Secretary's
denial of passports have been predicated on two grounds: the absence of a
delegation of the specific authority asserted by the Secretary; and, if authorized
by Congress, the invalidity of the action taken on constitutional grounds. 5
Given the broad language of the authority delegated by Congress in the
Passport Act of 1926, 6 an express delegation of a specific authority asserted by
the Secretary is rarely found.? Instead, courts faced with delegation issues look
to the presence or absence of factors demonstrating implicit congressional
authorization of the particular action being challenged' In those cases where
implied authorization is found, courts move on to consider the impact of the
challenged action on the affected party's constitutional rights. 9 Recently, in
Haig v. Agee," the Supreme Court again considered the twin inquiries
necessitated by a challenge to the Secretary's actions." The Court determined
that Congress implicitly had authorized the Secretary to revoke passports on
the basis of perceived threats to national security. 12 The Court also concluded
that constitutional considerations respecting free speech, due process and inter-
national travel were not infringed impermissibly.' 3
In Agee, the plaintiff, Philip Agee, worked for the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) from 1957 to 1968." During the course of his employment, Agee
' 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
Act of July 3, 1926, ch. 772, 1, 44 Stat. 887 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
211a (1976 & Supp. II 1978)).
5 The statute states in relevant part:
[T]he Secretary of State may grant and issue passports, and cause passports to be
granted, issued, and verified in foreign countries by diplomatic representatives of
the United States, and by such consul generals, consuls, or vice consuls when in
charge, as the Secretary of State may designate, and by the chief or other executive
officer of the insular possessions of the United States, under such rules as the Presi-
dent shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States, and no
other person shall grant, issue, or verify such passports.
Id. Under Executive Order number 11,295, the President designated and empowered the Secre-
tary to exercise the authority conferred upon the President by the Passport Act of 1926 without
the approval or other action of the President. EXEC. ORDER No. 11,295, 31 Fed. Reg. 10603
(1966).
See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 55 2.01-2,06 (1958).
See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
6 See supra note 3.
' See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 8 (1965).
Id. at 8-13.
9 Id. at 13-18.
L° 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
" Id. at 282.
" Id. at 306.
15 Id.
14 Id. at 283.
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worked in various positions of trust within the CIA." He received formal train-
ing in clandestine operations," and became acquainted with numerous CIA
employees whose association with the CIA had not been officially acknowl-
edged." It was and still is Agee's belief that the CIA intervenes in the affairs of
foreign states on the side of those whose property and privilege rest upon the
remnants of archaic social systems long since discredited.' 8
 In 1974, Agee an-
nounced his intention to fight the CIA." As part of his campaign, Agee trav-
elled to various foreign countries, 20 and with the aid of collaborators, publicly
identified individuals and organizations abroad serving as CIA undercover
agents, employees or sources." The identifications may have prejudiced
American abilities to obtain intelligence," and provoked violence against the
persons and organizations identified."
Five years after Agee announced his campaign against the CIA, the State
Department revoked his passport. 24 Agee was notified in West Germany that
13 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Brief for Respondent at 5, Haig v. Agee 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
13 453 U.S. at 283. Agee held a press conference in London to announce his campaign.
Id. Agee's statement at the London conference was:
Today, I announced a new campaign to fight the United States CIA wherever
it is operating. This campaign will have two main functions: First, to expose CIA of-
ficers and agents and to take the measures necessary to drive them out of the coun-
tries where they are operating; secondly, to seek within the United States to have the
CIA abolished.
This effort to identify CIA people in foreign countries has been going on for
some time . . (Today's) list was compiled by a small group of Mexican com-
rades whom I trained to follow the comings and goings of CIA people before I left
Mexico City.
Similar lists of CIA people in other countries are already being compiled and
will be announced when appropriate. We invite participation in this campaign from
all those who strive for social justice and national dignity.
Appendix E to Petition for Certiorari at 107a, Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
" 453 U.S. at 284.
21 Id. John N. McMahon, Deputy Director for Operations of the Central Intelligence
Agency, charged that Agee directly or indirectly exposed CIA employees in London, Lisbon,
Sweden, Angola, Madrid, The Hague, Switzerland, LaPaz, Kingston, Australia and New
Zealand. Appendix E to Petition for Certiorari at 107a-111a, Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
" 453 U.S. at 284-85.
22
 Id. at 285. Loren Lawrence, United States Ambassador to Jamaica, noted that Louis
Wolf, who worked in collaboration with Philip Agee, held a press conference in Kingston expos-
ing the names of several CIA employees. Appendix H to Petition for Certiorari at 125a, Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). Shortly thereafter attempts were made on the lives of several of these
newly-exposed CIA employees. Id. at 125a-127a.
" 453 U.S. at 286. The State Department letter notifying Agee of the revocation read
in part:
The Department's action is predicated upon a determination made by the
Secretary under the provisions of [22 C.F.R.] Section 51.70(b)(4) that your ac-
tivities abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national
security or the foreign policy of the United States. The reasons for the Secretary's
determination are, in summary, as follows: Since the early 1970's it has been your
stated intention to conduct a continuous campaign to disrupt the intelligence opera-
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the revocation occurred because his actions had caused or were likely to cause
serious damage to the national security and foreign policy of the United
States." The revocation was made under the provisions of sections 51.70(b)(4)
and 51.71(a) of Title 22 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 26 Agee was ad-
vised of his right to a hearing" and was given the opportunity to have that
hearing expedited." Rather than pursue the administrative avenue available to
him," Agee filed suit against the Secretary of State in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia."
Agee attacked the Secretary's revocation of his passport on two grounds:
first, he argued that the regulations, upon which the authority to revoke his
passport was based, had not been authorized by Congress;" second, Agee con-
tended that the regulations were facially unconstitutional, claiming that they
impermissibly conflicted with rights guaranteed under the first and fifth
amendments to the Constitution." Agee petitioned the district court for
declaratory and injunctive relief." To facilitate his challenges to the validity of
the Secretary's regulations, Agee conceded, for purposes of his summary judg-
ment motion, that his actions were likely to cause serious damage to the na-
tional security of the United States."
tions of the United States. In carrying out that campaign you have travelled in
various countries (including, among others, Mexico; the United Kingdom, Den-
mark, Jamaica, Cuba, and Germany), and your activities in those countries have
caused serious damage to the national security and foreign policy of the United
States. Your stated intention to continue such activities threatens additional damage
of the same kind.
Appendix G to Petition for Certiorari at 120a, Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
25 Id.
26 Id. The two regulations involved read in relevant part:
(b) A passport may be refused in any case in which: . . . (4) The Secretary deter-
mines that the national's activities abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious
damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States.
22 C.F.R. 5 51.70(b)(4) (1980).
A passport may be revoked, restricted or limited where: (a) The national would not
be entitled to issuance of new passport under $ 51.70.
22 C.F.R. 5 51.71(a) (1980).
27 453 U.S. at 287.
25 Id.
29 Id. at n.10.
'° Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1980).
" Id. at 730.
22
 Id.
" Id.
" Id. By conceding this point, Agee removed all questions of fact, and presented "a
pure question of law" to the court. Id. The transcript detailing Agee's concession reads • in part:
MR. WULF: If you are saying, Your Honor, that you will not hear an over-
breadth argument and that the only argument that you want to hear is the question
of basic authority, we will argue just that question and we will concede the charges
as they are made in the letter to Agee, which is part of the record.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. WULF: O.K. Whatever they charge, we will concede it is true.
THE COURT: For purposes of challenging the regulation.
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On cross-motions for summary judgment," the district court noted that
the Secretary's authority to regulate passports can be no greater than that
which Congress chose to delegate under the Passport Act of 1926. 36 To prove
the revocation was a proper exercise of such authority, the court stated, the
Secretary must demonstrate that he acted "pursuant to an explicit delegation
or that he had followed 'sufficiently substantial and consistent' administrative
practice to warrant the implied approval of Congress."" Turning to the first
inquiry, the district court noted that the Passport Act of 1926 did not expressly
empower the Secretary to deny or revoke a passport on national security
grounds, and that there had been no subsequent legislation relating to
passports that had expressly delegated such authority." Finding no express
delegation of authority, the court next considered whether Congress had im-
plicitly condoned the Secretary's actions." The court determined that there
was no substantial and consistent administrative practice of passport revoca-
tions based on national security and foreign policy interests." The court
therefore concluded that there was no implicit congressional approval of such
conduct." Because it concluded that the regulation lacked congressional ap-
proval, the district court did not consider the additional attacks on the regula-
MR. WULF: For purposes of challenging their authority to adopt and apply
the regulation.
THE COURT: That is where I thought we were.
MR. WULF: Right. We went around a little bit. That is what I first con-
ceded. I don't want to argue the over-breadth issue. I guess I will have to save that
for another day.
Joint Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 19, Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). Agee did not
contest the allegations point by point since the theory of his case was that the Secretary of State
has no congressional authorization to revoke passports for national security reasons under 22
C.F.R. S 51.70(b) no matter what accusations might be made against a citizen. Brief for
Respondent at 1, Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). Age; however, did contest the truth of a
newspaper report that he had been invited to travel to Iran to participate in the hostage incident.
Id. at 4. Agee denied having received the invitation and claims that he would not have accepted it
under any circumstances. Id. at 4-5. Agee did state, however, that he would consider going to
Iran once the American hostages were released and only at that point would he reveal any CIA
names or sit upon a tribunal. See Joint Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 29-30, Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
" 483 F. Supp. at 730.
36 Id.
" Id. at 731.
38 Id.
38 Id.
48 Id.
43 Id. In addition, the court stated that implied authority was not to be inferred from
legislative inaction, especially, when—as with the instant case—the Executive had introduced a
bill which would have expressly granted the Secretary the power asserted in the Agee case. Id. at
731-32 & nn. 7-8. For a discussion concerning these hearings see Note, Passport Revocations or
Denials on the Ground of National Security and Foreign Policy, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 1178, 1185-1188
(1981) [hereinafter cited as, Passport Revocations].
The district court also declined to find Congress' implicit adoption of the regulations in the
1978 amendment to the Passport Act of 1926, which added a provision prohibiting passport
restrictions except for countries "with which the United States is at war, where armed hostilities
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tion based on the first and fifth amendments." Agee's motion for summary
judgment was granted," and his passport ordered restored."
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia affirmed the district court's judgment. 45 The majority opinion stated that
"the Secretary of State must demonstrate that Congress has authorized 22
C.F.R. S51.70(b)(4) either by express delegation or by a 'sufficiently substan-
tial and consistent' administrative practice to warrant finding the implied ap-
proval of Congress." 46 The decision noted first that neither the Passport Act of
1926 nor any subsequent legislation relating to passports expressly authorizes
the Secretary of State to deny or revoke passports on national security or
foreign policy grounds. 47 The appellate court then declared that there was no
substantial and consistent administrative practice demonstrating implied con-
gressional authorization for the challenged regulations." The circuit court
reasoned that " 'only the clearest . . . evidence [of past administrative and
legislative practicer " would have permitted the court " 'to consider Congres-
sional silence to be a substitute for explicit and affirmative legislative action in
limiting the free exercise of important rights.' "49 Like the district court, the
circuit court majority did not address Agee's constitutional claims because of
the invalidation of the regulation. 5 °
In dissent, Circuit Judge MacKinnon came to four conclusions contrary
to the majority's reasoning. First, the judge reasoned that the President was
authorized to revoke Agee's passport in a hostage situation, such as that in Iran
at the time of Agee's passport revocation. 51 Second, the dissent declared that
are in progress, or where there is imminent danger to the public health or the physical safety of
United States travellers." 483 F. Supp. at 732 (referring to the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-426, 124, 92 Stat. 963, 971 (1978) (codified at 22 U. S.0
211a (Supp. II 1978))).
42 483 F. Supp. at 732.
43 Id.
" Id.
44 Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1981). For a commentary on the opin-
ions in Agee v. Muskie see 22 HARV. INT'L L. J. 187 (1981) and 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 508
(1981). See generally Note, Passport Revocations, supra note 41.
46 629 F.2d at 85.
47 Id. The court stated that the failure of Congress to enact legislation which would have
expressly empowered the Secretary to act as he did in the instant case, does not support the Secre-
tary's contention that Congress already delegated the power. Id. & n.4. Neither did the lack of
mention in the 1978 amendment to the Passport Act of 1926 of the power asserted by the
Secretary in the instant case support the Secretary's contention that Congress authorized the
asserted power. Id. at 85.
46 Id. at 86.
49 Id. at 87 (quoting Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F. Supp. 974, 985 (D.D.C. 1972) aff'd
mem., 486 F. 2d 1317 (1973) (Requirement of oath of allegiance for all applicants for United
States passports is an unconstitutional abridgement of the Fifth Amendment right to travel
abroad).
5° 629 F.2d at 87 n.9. The majority also noted that without a formal allegation of
criminal activity, it was not sufficient that Agee's conduct may have been considered by some to
border on treason. Id. at 87.
" Id. at 109 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). The dissent made reference to 22 U.S.C.
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since Agee's acts were illegal the passport could be denied. 52 Third, he stated
that passports could be denied on national security and foreign policy grounds,
and that such a denial would be consistent with prior administrative practice."
Finally, the dissenting judge concluded that Congress intended to allow the Ex-
ecutive the right to deny passports on national security grounds when an in-
dividual's travel would be " 'inconsistent with a greater government
interest.' ' '54
The principal issue on appeal" before the Supreme Court was whether the
Passport Act of 1926 authorized the regulations pursuant to which the
Secretary acted in revoking Agee's passport . 56 Moreover, unlike the lower
courts, the Court also addressed Agee's constitutional challenges to the regula-
tions." In a 7-2 decision written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that
"the policy announced in the challenged regulations [was] `sufficiently
substantial and consistent' to compel the conclusion that Congress ha[d] ap-
proved it."" The Court also found that the revocation was not invalid on its
face despite Agee's constitutional challenges. Specifically, the Court acknowl-
edged that while the freedom to travel was curtailed, the liberty interest in
international travel is subject to reasonable governmental reg-ulation." 59
Considerations of national security and foreign policy justified the impediment
to travel."' Moreover, the Court found that the revocation did not unconstitu-
tionally impinge on first amendment rights. 61 Since Agee's stated purpose was
to impede the American intelligence system, his disclosures did not constitute
protected speech. 62 In addition, the Court noted, by hindering Agee's ability to
travel, the passport revocation curtailed only conduct, not speech." Finally,
when there is a substantial likelihood of serious damage to the national security
or foreign policy resulting from a citizen's activities, the Court ruled that the
government was not required to hold a prerevocation hearing. 64
1732 (1976) and to the authority of Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). Judge MacKinnon
declared that § 1732 was implied in the instant case. 629 F.2d at 109 n.65 (MacKinnon, J.,
dissenting). The majority, however, disagreed. Id. at 84 n.3.
52 Id. at 110 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). The dissent made reference to 18 U.S.C. §
793(d) (1976) and to the authority of Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127 (1958).
" 629 F.2d at 110 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). The dissent made referel c:e to he
authority of Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). The majority did not agree with this :ut:; , pr:.ta-
don of the Zemel decision. 629 F.2d at 84 n.3.
" Id. at 110 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
" The Supreme Court granted certiorari and denier! 	 s	 tr: vacat_	 ;tay
previously entered. 449 U.S. 818 (1980).
56
 453 U.S. at 289.
" Id. at 306.
58 Id. Justice Blackmun concurred. Justice Brennan wroi-; the dissenting opinion in
which he was joined by Justice Marshall.
59 Id.
6° Id.
6 ' Id. at 308-09.
" Id. at 309.
63 Id.
64 Id.
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Justice Brennan's dissent stated that there must be a substantial and con-
sistent administrative practice, and not just a substantial and consistent ad-
ministrative policy, to prove that Congress implicitly authorized the action of
the Secretary. 65 Since Congress was not faced previously with actual instances
of the regulation being invoked to permit the Secretary to revoke passports for
national security reasons, Brennan reasoned that Congress' inaction did not
establish an implicit authorization of the regulation. 66 Because Justice Brennan
found that the Secretary's actions pursuant to the regulations were an unlawful
exercise of authority by the Secretary, he did not address, except in a footnote,
the constitutional issues presented in the case. 67
The Supreme Court in Haig v. Agee further defined its standard for deter-
mining whether actions taken by an administrative agency fall within authority
implicitly delegated by Congress to the Executive. Significantly, the Agee deci-
sion clarifies the Supreme Court's previous holdings as to when congressional
approval can be implied from a substantial and consistent administrative
policy. The decision is also important because it finds that regulations which
may affect the first and fifth amendments are not invalid on their face when
their language permits their use only in instances of serious damage to the na-
tional security or foreign policy of the United States.
This casenote will consider the Supreme Court's decision in Haig v. Agee in
light of its precedent and the important constitutional rights at issue. First, the
casenote will discuss briefly two prior Supreme Court decisions of particular
precedential importance to the Agee Court. The reasoning of both the majority
and dissent in Agee with respect to the determination of whether Congress in-
tended the Secretary to have the authority to deny or revoke passports on na-
tional security grounds will then be set forth. Next, the constitutional aspects of
the decision will be considered. Thereafter, this casenote will turn to an
analysis of the majority's opinion to provide an indication of the current status
of the law. It will be submitted that Agee constitutes neither a departure from
prior case law concerning congressional delegation of authority to the Ex-
ecutive to revoke passports, nor a limitation on the exercise of any previously
recognized constitutional rights.
I. THE PRECEDENT FOR HAIG V. AGEE
Two earlier Supreme Court decisions were of particular precedential im-
portance to both the majority and dissent in Agee in their respective attempts to
determine whether implied authority existed to deny or revoke Agee's pass-
port. Kent v. Dulles68 and Zemel v. Rusk69 addressed issues similar to those before
the Court in Agee.
65 Id. at 314 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 315-16.
67 Id. at 320 n.10.
" 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
69 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
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In 1958, the Court in Kent v. Dulles considered the dilemma of Rockwell
Kent and Walter Briehl. 7° Kent desired to travel to Europe to attend a meeting
of an organization known as the "World Council of Peace. "" The Director of
the Passport Office stopped issuance of Kent's passport on two grounds: "(1)
that he was a Communist and (2) that he had had 'a consistent and prolonged
adherence to the Communist Party line.' " 72 Briehl was also denied a passport
on the ground that he was a Communist." Both Kent and Briehl refused to
supply affidavits denying membership in the Communist Party . 74 If they had
stated that they were Communists, the regulation in question would have
automatically denied them a passport."
The Kent Court noted that although the Secretary had discretion in grant-
ing or refusing passports, the manner in which he exercised that discretion was
of prime importance. 76 The majority in Kent then found that "while the power
of the Secretary of State over the issuance of passports is expressed in broad
terms, it was apparently long exercised quite narrowly."" So far as was rele-
vant to the Kent Court, the administrative practice prior to 1926 had "jelled"
only around two categories for the refusal of passports: (1) questions regarding
the applicant's citizenship and his allegiance to the United States, and (2)
whether the applicant was engaging in illegal conduct." With respect to a third
category — Communist affiliation — the Kent Court stated that the State
Department rulings regarding Communists were infrequent and did not follow
a consistent pattern." The government was denying the petitioners' freedom of
movement, according to the Kent majority, "solely because of [the petitioners']
refusal to be subjected to inquiry into their beliefs and associations." 8° The
Court held that Congress had not delegated to the Secretary the authority to
withhold passports on the basis of the beliefs or associations of the citizens con-
cerned. 81
In Zemel v. Rusk," the plaintiff was a citizen of the United States who held
a valid passport and wished to visit Cuba at a time when the State Department
had imposed restrictions on such travel." The State Department denied
7° 357 U.S. at 116-120.
" Id. at 117.
72 Id. at 117-18.
73 Id. at 119.
74 Id.
" Id. at 118 n.2.
76 Id. at 125.
" Id. at 127.
78 Id. at 127-28. The Court did not view the petitioners as criminals, nor did the Court
know if they were Communists. Id. at 130. Even if the petitioners were Communists, the Court
noted that no law curtailing their movement had become effective. Id.
79 Id. at 128. The Court made it clear that the manner in which the Secretary had used
the discretion given him was very important. Id. at 125.
8° Id. at 130.
81 U.
82
 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
°3 Id. at 3.
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Zemel's request to have his passport validated for travel to Cuba as a tourist."
Zemel challenged the Secretary's denial on the grounds of absence of congres-
sional authorization and unconstitutionality. 85 Considering the delegation of
authority issue, the Supreme Court in Zemel went through the history
preceding the Passport Act of 1926 showing that the Executive had several
times "openly asserted" the power to impose travel restrictions." The Court
concluded that Congress intended by the passage of the Passport Act in 1926 to
continue authorizing the Executive to make such restrictions." The Zemel
Court went on to note that the post-1926 imposition of area restrictions was
relevant for three reasons: (1) courts construing a statute must give weight to
the interpretation of the statute by those who have the duty of administering it,
(2) Congress' failure to repeal or revise the statute in the face of administrative
interpretations occasionally has been held to be strong evidence that the ad-
ministrative interpretation was the one intended by Congress, and (3) despite
twenty-six years of interpretation by the Executive of the Passport Act as
authorizing the imposition of area restrictions, Congress in 1952, 88 (while
again approving legislation relating to passports) left untouched the broad rule-
making authority granted earlier: 89
Turning to the constitutionality issue, the Zemel Court distinguished Kent.
Since Kent concerned only passport refusals "based on the character of the par-
ticular applicant,"" the Zemel Court reasoned that the two categories found by
the Kent Court to justify refusals based on character — citizenship and illegal
conduct — were not the exclusive justifications for all passport refusals: 9 '
Thus, because Zemel involved a refusal based on foreign policy considerations,
and not upon the "beliefs and associations" grounds rejected by Kent, the Zemel
Court was not bound by the categories announced in Kent."
In sum, Kent held that denials of passports based upon the character of the
applicant had "jelled" only around two categories — citizenship and illegal
conduct. Due to the inconsistency of the rulings concerning Communists, the
84 Id. at 3-4.
89 Id. at 4. The appellant requested a judgment declaring: (1) that under the Constitu-
tion and the laws of the United States he was entitled to travel to Cuba and to have his passport so
validated; (2) that his travel to Cuba would not violate any law; (3) that the restrictions of the
Secretary of State were invalid; (4) that the Passport Act of 1926 and S 215 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 were unconstitutional; and (5) that the refusal of the Secretary to
allow appellant to travel to Cuba violated the Constitution and the United Nations Declaration of
Human Rights. Id. A procedural claim for a formal hearing was abandoned in the district court.
Id. SE n.l.
86 Id. at 8-9.
87 Id. at 9.
88 Id. at 12. The Court was referring to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163.
89 Id. at 11-12. The Kent Court did not feel it was necessary to look at post-1926 prac-
tice. 357 U.S. at 128.
9° 381 U.S. at 13.
91 Id.
92 Id.
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Kent Court rejected the contention that Congress had implicitly accepted, as a
third category, Communist party membership as grounds for "bad character"
denials. Zemel found that the authority to implement area restrictions was im-
plied in the Passport Act of 1926, and even if it was not, the post-1926 actions
by the Executive were of great importance in construing the statute, especially
given the congressional silence on those actions in the 1952 legislation. In
distinguishing Kent, the Zemel Court stated that the earlier decision's enumera-
tion of only two categories for justifying refusals — citizenship and illegal con-
duct — were not binding in the instant case, since in Zemel the denial of the
passport was not based on the character of the applicant. While both cases
spoke of past administrative actions, neither Kent nor Zemel stated explicitly
that only administrative practice and not policy would be considered in deter-
mining whether Congress had delegated authority.
II. THE OPINIONS IN HAIG V. AGEE
In affirming the Secretary of State's authority to revoke Philip Agee's
passport, the Supreme Court considered both whether the regulation authoriz-
ing the Secretary to take such action was beyond the scope of the enabling
statute, and whether the regulation was invalid on its face in the light of the
first and fifth amendments. The following section juxtaposes the reasoning of
the Agee majority on each issue against the dissent's contrary analysis.
A. Congressional Authorization of the Challenged Regulation
The Agee majority began its inquiry into the validity of the challenged
regulation under the Passport Act of 1926 by noting that the Act expressly
granted to the Secretary neither the power to deny nor revoke any passport. 93
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the majority stated that it was
clear that the Secretary of State has the power to deny a passport for reasons
not expressly stated in the statute." Furthermore, Agee conceded that a valid
reason to deny a passport would be a valid reason to revoke one. 95
The question presented, therefore, was not whether the Secretary had the
power to revoke any passport, but whether the challenged regulations were
within the scope of the revocation authority delegated by the Act. In light of the
broad rule-making authority granted in the Passport Act, the Court stated, "a
consistent administrative construction of that statute must be followed by the
93 453 U.S. at 290. See supra note 3,
94 453 U.S. at 290. In support of this statement, the Agee Court makes reference to Kent
v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127 (1958) (finding congressional acquiescence, for example, in an Ex-
ecutive policy of refusing passports to applicants participating in illegal conduct), and to Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (the weightiest considerations of national security authorized travel
restrictions).
95 453 U.S. at 291 (citing to the Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Haig v. Agee, 453
U.S. 280 (1981)).
March 1983]	 CilSENOTES	 445
courts 'unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong.' "96 Judicial
deference to such administrative constructions, the Court noted, is especially
called for in areas of foreign policy and national security. 97 Under such cir-
cumstances, reasoned the Court, congressional silence cannot be equated with
congressional disapproval. 98 The Agee Court therefore concluded that if a con-
sistent administrative construction existed whereby the Secretary of State
asserted the authority to revoke passports on foreign policy grounds, the Court
should and would defer to that construction if it were authorized by
Congress."
The Agee Court then determined that a consistent administrative construc-
tion to revoke passports on national security or foreign policy grounds was im-
plicitly ratified by Congress. The majority stated that the history of passport
controls from the beginning of the nation shows that Congress had recognized
the authority of the Executive to withhold passports for substantial reasons of
national security and foreign policy.'" The Agee majority stated that prior to
1856 the issuance of passports was viewed as a matter left solely to Executive
discretion and the Executive was presumed to exercise this power in the in-
terests of the nation."' In 1856, Congress passed legislation'° 2 to insure that
passport authority rested with the federal government as opposed to allowing
96 Id. (quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1977)
(quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969))). In Red Lion, the Court
declared "that the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed
unless there are corrnpelling indications that it is wrong, especially when Congress has refused to
alter the administrative construction." 395 U.S. at 381. The Agee Court also quoted a passage
from Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), stating:
[B]ecause of the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary international
relation's, and the fact that the Executive is immediately privy to information which
cannot be swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and acted upon by legislature, Con-
gress—in giving the Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs — must of
necessity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic
areas.
381 U.S. at 17.
97 453 U.S. at 291.
96 Id.
99 See id. at 291-92.
100 Id. at 293.
ioi Id.
I" Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 127, 5 23, 11 Stat. 52, 60. That statute read in relevant
part:
[T]he Secretary of State shall be authorized to grant and issue passports, and cause
passports to be granted, issued, and verified in foreign countries by such diplomatic
or consular officers of the United States, and under such rules as the President shall
designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States, and no other person
shall grant, issue, or verify any such passport; nor shall any passport be granted or
issued to, or verified for, any other persons than citizens of the United States... .
Id. The statute was amended to allow passports to be granted to non-citizens who were liable to
military duty by the laws of the United States. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 79, 5 23, 12 Stat. 744,
754. This amendment was later repealed. Act of May 30, 1866, ch. 102, 14 Stat. 54. The phrase
"shall be authorized to" was replaced with "may" in a later amendment. Rev. Stat. 5 4075
(1874).
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state and local officials to issue passports.'" The Court found that the 1856
Passport Act otherwise only acknowledged the authority already possessed by
the Secretary of State.'" The Court stated that the Executive branch con-
sistently understood the 1856 Passport Act to preserve the Secretary's authority
to withhold passports on national security or foreign policy grounds,'" and
noted that an emergency measure in 1861 which denied passports to persons
acting in ways that were dangerous to the nation 106 went unchallenged by
Congress.'"
Further evidence of the consistent interpretation given the statute by the
Executive branch was found in Attorney General opinions and Executive
Orders issued between 1869 and 1917. 108 To the Agee Court, these documents
indicated a consistent administrative policy of denying passports for national
security or foreign policy reasons.'° 2
 This policy denied passports, even in
times of peace, to those whose conduct abroad could embarrass the United
States, as well as to those who wished to upset the relationship between the
United States and the representatives of foreign governments. "0
 Congressional
enactment of the first travel control statute in 1918"' indicated to the Court a
clear congressional expectation that the Executive could control a citizen's in-
ternational travel in the interest of national security. " 2
It was in this atmosphere of broad Executive control of passports that the
Passport Act of 1926 (under which the regulations Agee challenged were pro-
mulgated) was passed. According to the Court, the language used by Congress
in 1926 was at times identical to that found in the 1856 Act as amended in
1874."$ Moreover, the Court declared that the legislative history of the
Passport Act of 1926 shows Congress knew of the Executive policy under the
old legislation.'" In the view of the Court, there was no evidence of any intent
"3 453 U.S. at 294 & n.27.
'" Id. at 294-95.
105 Id. at 295.
104
107
 Id. at n.29. See also supra note 102.
1" Ste 453 U.S. at 295-96. The Court noted a 1869 opinion of Attorney General Hoar,
id. (citing 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 89,92), and a 1901 opinion of Attorney.General Knox. Id. (citing 23
Op. Att'y Gen. 509, 511). The Court also noted several Executive orders. Id. & n. 31 (citing Ex-
ec. Order No. 654 (1907), Exec. Order No. 2119-A (1915); Exec. Order No. 2362-A (1916), &
Exec. Order No. 2519-A (1917)).
"3 453 U.S. at 295.
"° Id. at 296.
11 Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 81, SS 1 & 2, 44 Stat. 559. The statute forbade any attempt
to enter or leave the United States during wartime without a passport, except where the Ex-
ecutive so provided, when the President proclaimed that this restriction was warranted in light of
the public safety. Id.
112 453 U.S. at 296-97.
"3 See supra note 102.
114
 453 U.S. at 297 (citing Validity of Passports: Hearings on H.R. 11947 Beare the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 8, 10-11 (1926) [hereinafter, 1926 Passport Hear-
ings]). Of particular interest is the dialogue between Mr. Henry A. Cooper, Representative from
Wisconsin, Mr. Morton D. Hull, Representative from Illinois, and Mr. Wilbur J. Carr, Assist-
ant Secretary of State:
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on the part of Congress to reject the administrative construction of the 1856
Act.'" The Court, therefore, concluded that Congress adopted the broad,
longstanding administrative construction of the 1856 Act in the 1926 Act. 16
Chief Justice Burger indicated that the Executive interpreted the 1926
legislation to authorize denial of passports for reasons of national security or
foreign policy.'" This administrative construction of the Passport Act was
MR. COOPER. It is my judgment based on what I have seen of the evolution of
legislation in Congress, that there is altogether too much power given to a depart-
ment to prescribe rules and regulations, the violation of which amounts almost to a
violation of law. Why should there not be some of these regulations printed in the
statute so that they shall be a part of the law and not left to the discretion of an ex-
ecutive officer to prescribe?
MR. HULL. If you can foresee exactly what you want in advance, I would say
that that would be true, but a lot of detail cannot be foreseen.
MR. COOPER. I do not know of any condition about the issuing of a passport
that cannot be foretold. There is no prophecy about it. You do not want to make it a
matter of favoritism here and favoritism there, but a rule for all individuals who ask
for passports, and it ought to be incorporated in the law. There is no question, Mr.
Hull, but what there has been going on a gradual accretion of power in the executive
departments to make rules and regulations and the conditions ought to be in the law
itself in many, many instances.
MR. HULL. That may be true.
MR. COOPER. That is so particularly in the Treasury Department.
MR. HULL. But as long as you are appointing boards and commissions, etc.,
without a perfectly clear foreknowledge as to the method of operation and the con-
tingencies that may arise, it seems to me you have always got to have considerable
discretion in the board, etc.
MR. COOPER. This leaves the law in an executive officer.
MR. HULL. I do not know where you could draw the line as to that. They have
to have some discretionary power.
MR. COOPER. Nobody disputes that, that there has got to be some discretion,
but not unlimited discretion.
MR. CARR. If I may make a suggestion, these rules are administrative rules;
for instance, in regard to the rules that the President issues for the granting of
passports, I would say that no human being could foresee the different things that
must be provided for that will come up from time to time under different conditions,
different modes of travel and various things that arise in the course of a period of
time. They are such that I do not think any body of legislators or administrators
could foresee, Mr. Cooper.
MR. COOPER. Can the executive foresee anything that he could not and come
here and tell us about, and then make rules and regulations which really are rules
and regulations, or does he leave it to an individual instance for him to exercise his
discretion?
MR. CARR. The individual cases bring up the necessity for changes in the
rules, or the amplification of the rules, judging from its past experience in the issu-
ing of passports and in constantly being confronted year after year with new condi-
tions, which must be provided for by changes in the rules, the department naturally
reaches the conclusion that the only practicable method is to give the President or
the Secretary of State discretion over the administrative rules.
1926 Passport Hearings at 5.
"s 453 U.S. at 297.
" 6 Id. at 297-98.
'" Id. at 298.
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often communicated to Congress.'" The Court took special note13 of the 1978
amendments to the Passport Act"° and the Immigration and Nationality
Act."' In those amendments the Court saw strong evidence that Congress had
approved the Secretary of State's interpretation of the 1926 legislation since
Congress had the opportunity to register its dissatisfaction with the construc-
tion, but refused to do so." 2
The Agee Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that for congressional
approval to be found, a longstanding enforcement of the claimed power must
exist.'" The Court noted that there have been few situations in which a
passport holder's activities posed a substantial likelihood of serious damage to
the national security or foreign policy of the United States. 124 Nevertheless, the
Court declared, in those situations which did arise, the Secretary of State had
consistently exercised his power to deny or revoke passports. 125 The Court con-
cluded that actual enforcement of the claimed power is not the only way to
establish implicit congressional approval, but that it is enough that the Ex-
ecutive had "openly asserted" the power in issue. 126 The Court stated that if
there were few or no occasions for the Secretary of State to use his authority,
"the absence of frequent instances of enforcement [would be] wholly irrele-
vant. "127
By holding that an agency's longstanding assertion of power alone, in the
face of congressional silence, may suffice to base a finding of implied congres-
sional delegation of authority, the Court was confronted with a seeming
obstacle posed by its holding in Kent u. Dulles.' 28 In Kent, the Court addressed
the Secretary's practice of denying passports on the grounds of bad
character.'" Finding no history of consistent refusals of passports to Com-
munists for their beliefs, the Kent Court refused to find an implied congression-
al approval of the asserted authority.' 30 The Agee Court, however, ruled that
Kent did not foreclose congressional approval of an administrative policy rather
than a practice.'" Instead, the Agee Court interpreted Kent to turn on the fact
that the governmental policy complained of had not been enforced consistent-
"8 Id. at 298-300.
19 Id. at 300-01.
120 See supra note 41.
12 ' Foreign Relation Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. L. No, 95-426, 5 707,
92 Stat. 963, 992-93 (1978) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 5 1185 (Stipp. II (1978))).
122 453 U.S. at 301.
128
 Id. at 301-02.
124 Id. at 302.
12 ' Id. The Court listed three instances to back this statement: (1) a denial to a Con-
gressman who wished to travel to Greece in 1948; (2) a revocation of an arms supplier's
passport, and (3) revocations to hopeful visitors of the site of an international hijacking. Id.
126 Id. at 303 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 9 (1965)).
187 Id. at 302.
128 357 U.S. 116 (1958). See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
129 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
' 2° Ste supra notes 79 and 81 and accompanying text.
18 ' 453 U.S. at 303.
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ly." 2
 According to the Chief Justice, the Kent Court strongly doubted whether
there was any definable and apparent policy which Congress could have ac-
knowledged)" In contrast, the Agee majority declared that there was no basis
for a claim that the Executive had failed to enforce its policy against passport
holders whose conduct was likely to cause serious damage to the national
security or foreign policy)"
In addition, the Chief Justice stated that the Kent Court had not been
called upon to decide whether the Executive had been authorized to revoke a
passport because of conduct damaging to the national security and foreign
policy of the United States)" The Agee Court thus concluded that Kent's
holding that only illegal conduct and problems of allegiance were grounds for
revocation or denial were not exclusive. 196 According to the Agee majority, the
denials of passports in Kent rested solely on the basis of political beliefs which
were entitled to first amendment protection)" The Chief Justice stated that
the protection given to beliefs is greater than that accorded conduct)" In the
opinion of the Agee majority, the State Department was not making any un-
constitutional presumption that Agee's beliefs will endanger the security of the
United States."9
 Agee's passport was revoked because his conduct was a
1 " Id.
'" Id.
"4 Id. The majority confronted the contention that the statements of Executive policy
are only entitled to diminished weight — on the ground that many of those statements concern
the powers of the Executive in wartime — by stating that the statute provides no support for that
argument. Id. Noting that Congress occasionally considered it necessary to legislate peacetime
passport restrictions which also allowed the Executive considerable discretion, id. at n.56, the
Court stated that grave problems of national security and foreign policy are not limited to times
of declared war. Id. at 303.
155 453 U.S. at 304.
16 Id. The Court was referring to 357 U.S. at 127-28.
'" 453 U.S. at 304.
"B See id. at 305 (citing Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (holding un-
constitutional 5 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 which made it criminal for any
member of a Communist organization which is registered or ordered to be registered to apply,
renew or attempt to use a passport)).
I" 453 U.S. at 305-06. The Agee Court therefore distinguished Kent and Aptheker, which
found the regulations there challenged to establish an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption
that individuals who are members of Communist organizations will be dangerous to American
security. Id. In addition, the Agee Court distinguished Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958) on
the same grounds. Id. at 305 n.57. In Dayton, the Secretary of State refused a passport to a
physicist who wished to visit India. 357 U.S. at 145. The text of a letter from the Director of the
Passport Office in Dayton stated in part: the determining factor in the case was Mr. Dayton's
association with persons suspected of being part of the Rosenberg espionage ring and his alleged
presence at an apartment in New York which was allegedly used for microfilming material ob- •
tained for the use of a foreign government." Id. at 146. The letter also stated that "in view of cer-
tain factors of Mr. Dayton's case which I am not at liberty to discuss with him, the Department
must adhere to its previous decision that it would be contrary to the best interests of the United
States to provide Mr. Dayton with passport facilities at this time." Id. The Dayton Court found
that the denial of Dayton's passport was impermissible under Kent which was decided on the
same day. Id. at 150. The Agee Court failed to find a mention of Dayton's conduct as distin-
guished from support for the Communist movement or association with known Communists in
the Appendix to the Dayton decision. 453 U.S. at 305 n,57.
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serious danger to the national security, and thus the two Kent categories for
denial on the basis of the applicant's character were not controlling."°
In summary, the Agee Court recognized that in revoking passports the Ex-
ecutive could only exercise the authority delegated to it by Congress. Since it
was undisputed that the Secretary lacked explicit authorization under the
Passport Act of 1926 to revoke passports for national security, a finding of im-
plicit authorization became necessary to justify authorization for the
Secretary's action. The Court stated that a consistent administrative construc-
tion, especially in foreign policy areas, should be given great weight unless
there are compelling indications that it is wrong. According to the Court, the
history of passport legislation shows that the Executive policy of denial or
revocation on national security grounds was longstanding and that Congress
accepted this longstanding Executive construction in 1926. This administrative
interpretation, the Court noted, has remained consistent, and Congress did not
reject the construction when it again legislated in 1978.
Moreover, the Agee majority distinguished Kent on the ground that this
earlier case concerned only the denial of passports on the basis of an applicant's
character. Since Agee concerned the revocation of a passport because of serious
damage to the national security, and not because of the applicant's character,
the two valid categories for denials articulated in Kent, the Court reasoned,
were not controlling in Agee. In addition, the Agee Court stated that any inter-
pretation of Kent which would find administrative practice as the exclusive man-
ner in which congressional authorization could be implied was wrong. Instead,
administrative practice was but an indication of administrative policy. In the
Court's view, if there were no opportunities for administrative practice, then
instances of enforcement would not be relevant. If, however, there were several
instances or occasions for administrative action and the result was an inconsist-
ent pattern, then this inconsistent pattern would be indicative of an inconsist-
ent policy. The Agee majority concluded by stating that the policy in the regula-
tions under challenge was " 'sufficiently substantial and consistent' to compel
the conclusion that Congress [had] approved it. ' 141
Justice Brennan's dissent in Agee differed sharply from the majority's
opinion. According to the dissent, Kent v. Dulles' 42 and Zemel v. Rusk143 stand for
the proposition that the Executive's power to revoke passports must be narrow-
ly construed, as must any delegated powers that curtail the exercise of constitu-
tionally protected rights.'" In Brennan's opinion, there was a presumption
that Congress must expressly delegate to the Secretary of State the authority to
140 See 453 U.S. at 304-06.
"I Id. at 306.
14 ' See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
143 See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
144 453 U.S. at 318 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Kent Court stated: "Where activities
or enjoyment, natural and often necessary to the well-being of an American citizen, such as
travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them."
357 U.S. at 129.
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deny or revoke passports for foreign policy or national security reasons before
he can lawfully exercise that authority.'" Since it was undisputed that the
Secretary lacked explicit authority under the Passport Act of 1926 to revoke or
deny passports for national security or foreign policy reasons, Justice Brennan
reasoned that the only remaining inquiry was whether Congress had implicitly
authorized such a practice.'" According to the dissent, an implied delegation
could be established only by a showing of an administrative practice that is suf-
ficiently substantial and consistent to justify the inference that Congress had
implicitly approved it. 147 The dissent stated neither Zemel nor Kent held that a
longstanding administrative policy or construction could indicate that Con-
gress had implicitly authorized the action of the Secretary.'" Justice Brennan
concluded:
Only when Congress had maintained its silence in the face of a con-
sistent and substantial pattern of actual passport denials or revoca-
tions — where the parties will presumably object loudly . . . to the
Secretary's exercise of discretion — can this Court be sure that Con-
gress is aware of the Secretary's actions and has implicitly approved
that exercise of discretion. 149
According to the dissent, besides assuring congressional awareness of the
Executive's policies, actual applications of the Executive branch's discretion
are more precise than sweeping policy statements, and thus allow Congress to
evaluate specific aspects of the challenged authority, not just its broad policy
implications.'" Justice Brennan also took exception to the majority's use in
Agee of Executive statements concerning construction and policy which he
believed the Kent Court had deemed irrelevant,'" The dissent saw the majori-
ty's use of the past constructions as resulting from the "paucity" of actual ad-
145 453 U.S, at 318 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 313-14.
147 Id. at 318.
148 Id. at 314. In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun acknowledges that there is
"some force" in Justice Brennan's observations on Kent and Zernel. Id. at 310 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). Nonetheless, Justice Blackmun does accept the majority's argument that longstand-
ing enforcement is not the exclusive manner in determining whether there is congressional
authorization. Id.
149 Id. at 315 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 315-16.
'" Id. at 316-17. The quotation from Kent relied on by Justice Brennan reads:
Under the 1926 Act and its predecessor a large body of precedents grew up
which repeat over and over again that the issuance of passports is "a discretionary
act" on the part of the Secretary of State. The scholars, the courts, the Chief Execu-
tive, and the Attorney General, all so said. (footnotes omitted). This long-continued
executive construction should be enough, it is said, to warrant the inference that
Congress had adopted it. (citations omitted). But the key to that problem, as we
shall see, is in the manner in which the Secretary's discretion was exercised, not in
the bare fact that he had discretion.
357 U.S. at 124-25. The precedents relied on by the Agee majority are mentioned supra at note
108.
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ministrative practice. 152 Finally, the dissent noted that even if the Court was
correct in its use of the administrative construction of passport legislation, there
was evidence that the Executive did not in fact construe the legislation to give
the Secretary of State the discretionary authority exercised in Agee.'"
In summary, the dissent reasoned that solely by a consistent and substan-
tial practice, not policy, could there by implied authority from Congress.
Moreover, Justice Brennan questioned the use of Executive constructions
which he believed the Kent Court found irrelevant. Finally, the dissent
wondered if indeed the Executive had consistently construed the legislation as
alleged. The majority and dissent also differed in their conclusions on Agee's
claims under the first and fifth amendments.
B. The First and Fifth Amendments
According to the Agee majority, since passport regulations apply only in
cases involving the likelihood of serious damage to national security or foreign
policy, Agee's claims that the Secretary's actions were invalid on constitutional
grounds were "without merit." 154
 Agee asserted three grounds for finding the
challenged regulations unconstitutional: the inhibition on his freedom to travel
abroad; the infringement of his right to free speech by halting his criticism of
the government; and the violatiOn of his right to procedural due process by de-
nying him a prerevocation hearing.' 55
Considering the first ground, the Court made it clear that the freedom to
travel abroad had to be distinguished from the right to travel within the United
States.' 56 The Agee majority noted that the freedom to travel outside the United
States with a passport is subordinate to considerations of national security and
12 453 U.S. at 317 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' 5 ' Id. at n.7. Justice Brennan stated that the State Department's seeking of legislation
from Congress of "the sort of authority exercised in this case" suggested that the Executive did
not believe it had such authority. Id. (citing, e.g., S. 4110, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 103(6) (1958)).
The dissent also suggested that the Executive did not construe the Passport Act of 1926 to grant
to the Executive the authority asserted here since in two opinions of the Attorney General there
was reference to the unqualified rights of citizens to passports. Id. (citing 15 Op. Att'y Gen. 114,
117 (1876) & 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 397, 398 (1871)).
1 " 453 U.S. at 306.
155 Id.
"6 Id. (citing Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978)). Aznavorian concerned S
1611(f) of the Social Security Act (codified at 42 U.S.0 1382(f) (1976)) which provided in part
that no person shall receive supplemental security income "for any month during all of which
such individual is outside the United States." 439 U.S. at 171. The Aznavorian Court stated that
"legislation which is said to infringe the freedom to travel abroad is not to be judged by the same
standard applied to laws that penalize the right of interstate travel, such as durational residency
requirements imposed by the states." 439 U.S. at 176-77. The Aznavorian Court went on to state,
however, that:
The statutory provision in issue here does not have nearly so direct an impact
on the freedom to travel internationally as occurred in the Kent, Aptheker, or Zemel
cases. It does not limit the availability or validity of passports. It does not limit the
right to travel on grounds that may be in tension with the First Amendment. It
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foreign policy.'" Thus the freedom to travel abroad is subject to reasonable
governmental regulation. 158 The majority found it "obvious and unarguable"
that the security of the United States is a compelling governmental interest,' 59
and the protection of American foreign policy is of great importance. 16° The
Chief Justice stated that protection of the secrecy of the government's foreign
intelligence operations served these interests.'" The Court stated that Agee
had both jeopardized the security of- the United States and imperiled the in-
terests of other countries, thus causing problems for American foreign
policy. 162 The majority said that restricting Agee's foreign travel was the only
means by which the government could curtail his activities harmful to the
United States. 153
Turning to the free speech challenge, the Agee majority found that even
assuming arguendo that protections under the first amendment extended outside
of the United States, Agee's first amendment claim lacked any basis.'"
According to the Chief Justice, since the purpose of Agee's disclosures was to
impede American foreign intelligence operations, including the recruitment of
intelligence personnel, the disclosures were not protected by the
Constitution.' 65 The .majority . said that even though Agee was contempo-
merely withdraws a governmental benefit during and shortly after an extended
absence from this country. Unless the limitation imposed by Congress is wholly irra-
tional, it is constitutional in spite of its incidental effect on international travel.
Id. at 177.
157 453 U.S. at 306.
' 66 Id. Kent held that there was a right to travel inherent in the concept of liberty, and
that the right to travel could not be abridged without due process of law. 357 U.S. at 125. The
Kent Court then went on to add:
Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as
well, was a part of our heritage. Travel abroad, like travel within the country, may
be necessary for a livelihood. It may be as close to the heart of the individual as the
choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in our
scheme of values.
Id. at 126. Zen:el noted, however, that this does not mean that it can under no circumstances be
inhibited. 381 U.S. at 14.
156 453 U.S. at 307 (citing Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)). See supra
note 138. See also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) (Court stating that
for while the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide
pact").
160 453 U.S. at 307.
151 Id.
160 Id. at 308 & n.59.
165 Id. at 308 & n.60.
164 Id. at 308.
165 Id. at 308-09. The Agee Court cites Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Near
concerned a statute which would restrain, as a public nuisance, the printing of a publication
which made "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" accusations. Id. at 701-02. The defendants
in Near had made several charges against public officials. Id. at 704. The Near Court found the
statute to be an infringement of the freedom of the press guaranteed by the first and fourteenth
amendments. Id. at 723. The Near Court did state, however, that the federal government could
prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting services or the publication of transport sailing dates or
the location and number of troops. Id. at 716. Agee conceded for the purpose of his motion that
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raneously criticizing the government, his conduct was not "beyond the reach
of the law."'" Furthermore, the Chief Justice maintained, any inhibition on
Agee as a result of the revocation of his passport operated only as an inhibition
of his actions rather than of his speech.' 67
Chief Justice Burger went on to hold that based on the record, the govern-
ment was not required to hold a prerevocation hearing.'" The majority stated
that when it is very likely that serious damage to the national security or to
American foreign policy would result because of a passport holder's activities
abroad, the government may ensure that the passport holder will not exploit
the "sponsorship" of his travels by the United States. 169
 Although the Court
did not decide whether the procedures followed were the constitutional
minima,"° it did rule that a postrevocation hearing satisfied due process."'
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan noted that because he con-
sidered the exercise of the regulations invalid, he did not need to decide the
constitutional issues presented in the case. 172
 Nevertheless, Justice Brennan
stated that several parts of the Chief Justice's treatment of Agee's constitu-
tional claims needed comment either because they were "extreme over-
simplifications of constitutional doctrine or mistaken views of the law and facts
of this case.'" Addressing first Chief Justice Burger's characterization of the
his actions fell under the regulations. This was done to challenge the validity of the regulations on
their face and not their application to his case. The Agee majority apparently must have believed
that a concession of "serious damage" was identical to the extreme factual situation of Near since
no facts were established as to Agee's actions.
166
 453 U.S. at 309.
167 Id. In addition, the majority stated that they agreed with the district court. that since
Agee's conduct falls within the core of the regulation, Agee lacks standing to contend that the
regulation was vague and overbroad. Id. at n.61. The Agee majority also noted that there was no
basis for a claim that the regulation was being used to punish criticism, nor was there any founda-
tion for a claim of discriminatory enforcement. Id.
162 Id. at 309.
169 Id. (citing Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956)). Cole concerned a government
employee who was fired by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare because he allegedly
was a risk to national security. 351 U.S. at 539-40. The government claimed it was empowered
to so act by the Act of August 26, 1950, ch. 803, 64 Stat. 476, which gave the heads of certain
federal departments and agencies "summary suspension and unreviewable dismissal powers"
over employees "when deemed 'in the interest of national security.' " 351 U.S. at 538. The Cole
Court held that the discharge of the petitioner was not authorized by the 1950 Act. Id. at 557.
The Court declared that for summary powers to be available, the national security must be im-
mediately threatened. Id. at 546. The Cole Court went on to state:
Indeed,'in view of the stigma attached to persons dismissed on loyalty grounds, the
need for procedural safeguards seems even greater than in other cases, and we will
not lightly assume that Congress intended to take away those safeguards in the
absence of some overriding necessity, such as exists in the case of employees handl-
ing defense secrets.
Id. at 546-47.
"° 453 U.S. at n.62. The procedures which were followed were: "a statement of reasons
and an opportunity for a prompt postrevocation hearing." Id. at'310.
1 " Id. at 310.
"2 Id. at 320 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
173 Id.
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regulation as affecting only Agee's conduct, not his speech, Justice Brennan
stated that under such reasoning a long prison sentence imposed upon a person
who criticized the government's food stamp policy would represent but an in-
hibition of action, since the imprisoned individual would still remain free to
criticize the government of the United States, albeit from a prison cell.'" For
Justice Brennan, then, the conclusion that the revocation restricted speech was
inescapable.
In addition, Justice Brennan took exception to the Chief justice's conclu-
sion that Agee's disclosures were not protected by the Constitution.'" Instead
the dissent stated that the disclosures were indeed protected speech and re-
quired the Court to balance the first amendment right to speak against govern-
mental interests.'" Justice Brennan said that Agee's concession in the trial
court concerning his danger to the national security or foreign policy of the
United States was only for the purpose of challenging the validity of the regula-
tions on their face and not their application to Agee's case.'" Thus, according
to the dissent, until the facts are known,"s it was not clear whether Agee's con-
duct was as extreme as asserted by the majority.'"
III. AN ANALYSIS OF HAIL V. AGEE
As will be shown, Haig v. Agee is consistent with Court precedent in its
determination that a consistent and substantial administrative policy can imply
congressional authorization. Moreover, the Agee Court was correct in finding
"4 Id.
"5 Id.
16 Id. at 320-21 n.10. Justice Brennan declared that the test announced in New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), was probably more applicable to the Agee situa-
tion than was the test in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), see supra note 165, which was
relied on by the majority. 453 U.S. at 321 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The New York Times
case concerned the attempt to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from
publishing a classified study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam
Policy." 403 U.S. at 714. The per curiam decision found that: " 'Any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity.' " Id. (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). "The Govern-
ment 'thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of • such a
restraint.' " 403 U.S. at 714 (quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,
419 (1971)). The New York Times Court found that the Government had not met that burden. 403
U.S. at 714.
177
 453 U.S. at 321 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In
 Justice Brennan thus states that the majority's use of the holding in Near, 453 U.S. at
308, was wrong. Id. at 321 n. 10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Since Agee conceded his breach of the
regulations only to challenge their facial validity, any attempt by the majority to show that Agee's
first amendment claim lacked merit should have stated only that Agee's concessions may have
outweighed Agee's claim to protected speech, and not that facts, which have not been fully
established, be used to show a factual extreme situation. See supra note 165.
179 453 U.S. at 321 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra note 165 and accompanying
text. The dissent also expressed a fear that the reach of the Secretary's discretion may be too
great. 453 U.S. at 319 n.9. Thus Justice Brennan also dissented to the majority's statement that
Agee did not have standing to contend that the regulations are vague or overbroad. Id. at 321
n.10.
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that there was a substantial and consistent administrative policy for passport
revocations on national security grounds. Additionally, Justice Brennan's
statements that the majority used irrelevant factors and that the Executive did
not perceive that it had the asserted authority are not persuasive. Finally, the
majority's analysis of Agee's constitutional claims was correct.
A. The Analysis of Implied Authority
1. Consistency with the Kent and Zemel Precedent
In his determination that a "substantial and consistent" administrative
policy was sufficient to imply that Congress had adopthd the policy when Con-
gress legislated in 1926 and 1978, 18° Chief Justice Burger did not ignore the
precedents established by Ken! 1 e' and Zemel. 182
 Instead, the Chief Justice recon-
sidered the policy implications behind the two precedents, and then interpreted
their meanings in light of the situation presented in Agee.'" In Kent, the Court
considered whether implied congressional authorization existed for the
Secretary's policy denying passports to Communists. 184
 The Kent Court stated
that the administrative practice respecting denials of passports on the basis of
character had jelled only around two categories — citizenship and illegal con-
duct.'" Regarding the third asserted category — Communist affilia-
tion — State Department rulings were "scattered . . and not consistently of
one pattern. 186 The Kent Court therefore refused to imply congressional
' 8° 453 U.S. at 306. The Passport Act of 1926 does not expressly grant to the Executive
the power to revoke passports in the likelihood of serious damage to the national security or
foreign policy of the United States. See supra note 3. The Court therefore had to look for the
possibility of implied authority in order to show that there were no compelling indications that the
administrative construction was wrong. It has been suggested "that many judges are unaware of
. . any other . . criterion, other than legislative intent, of decision on such issues." 2A.C.
SANDS, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 5 45.07, at 20 (4th ed.
1973). The cited work suggests that what should be the approach of the courts is to look to the
"meaning" of the statute to the person on the "receiving" end as opposed to looking at the in-
tent of the legislative body which would be the "sending" end, Id. at 5 45.07, 20-21.
18 ' 357 U.S. 116 (1958). See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
182
 381 U.S. 1 (1965). See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text. The Court has con-
sistently stated that absent any compelling indications to the contrary, consistent administrative
construction of a statute is to be accorded weight. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & CO. v. Collins,
432 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1977); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969);
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1965); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Unemployment
Compensation Comm'n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153-54 (1946); Costanzo v. Till-
inghast, 287 U.S. 341, 345 (1932); Fawcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378
(1931); Brewster v. Cage, 280 U.S. 327, 336 (1930); Swendig v. Washington Water Power Co.,
265 U.S. 322, 331 (1924); Maryland Casualty Co. v.'United States, 251 U.S. 342, 349 (1920);
Logan v. Davis, 233 U.S. 613, 627 (1914); United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 760, 763
(1877); Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827).
183
 453 U.S. at 300-06.
184 357 U.S. at 117-120.
185
 Id. at 128.
188 Id.
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authorization.'" Chief Justice Burger in Agee interpreted Kent to turn on the
absence of a consistent adminstrative policy, as evidenced by the inconsistent
practice regarding Communists.'" Thus, the Agee Court concluded that Kent
does not require a pattern of actual enforcement to imply authority.'" If,
however, there were instances of administrative action , an inconsistent pattern
of performance would indicate an inconsistent administrative policy. 190
The Zemel Court, considering whether implied authorization existed for
the Secretary's area restrictions of passports, found very few instances of area
restrictions either before or after 1926. 19 ' This could thus indicate a
"paucity" 192
 of the administrative practice which Congress could have thought
about when it legislated on passports in 1926 or in 1952. Thus the basis to the
Zemel decision, arguably, could have been the existence of a substantial and
consistent administrative policy asserting the power to make area restrictions
which was consistently applied when needed, indicating that Congress was
aware of the policy when it legislated. 193 The Agee Court, therefore, read Zernel
107 Id,
189
 453 U.S. at 303.
139 Id.
190 See id.
19 ' 381 U.S. at 8. The pre-1926 instances cited by the Court were (1) a 1915 restriction
against going to Belgium during the famine; (2) the 1914 - WWI area restrictions; and (3) those
WWI restrictions which were continued through July 1922 for Austria and Germany and
through September 1923 for the Soviet Union. Id. The only post-1926 area restrictions were to
warring nations with whom America was neutral and to Communist nations immediately after
World War II. Id. at 9-11.
Interestingly, the area restrictions in Zemel could be seen to indicate an administrative policy
to use passports in its conduct of foreign policy, and in particular to keep travellers from harming
American policy. If an American travelling in a nation at war were killed, a response from the
United States, in one degree or another, would be necessary, Such a response could become
more difficult if America were trying to steer a neutral course. Thus, the government may have
imposed the area restrictions noted in Zemel so that its foreign policy would not be disrupted.
With regard to the post-1945 ban on passports to Communist nations, American confusion and
fear over the power of the Soviet Union is still within memory, see generally E. MAY, "LESSONS"
OF THE PAST: THE USE AND MISUSE OF HISTORY.IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1973), and
it could have been fear of disrupting American foreign policy that the area restrictions were im-
posed.
'" Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Agee, uses this term to describe the administrative
practice under discussion there. 453 U.S. at 317 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
193 See 381 U.S. at 8-9. The Zemel Court stated "that the 1926 Act must take its content
from history; it authorizes only those passport refusals and restrictions 'which it could fairly be
argued were adopted by Congress in light of prior administrative practice.' " 381 U.S. at 17-18
(quoting Kent, 357 U.S. at 128). The Agee Court implicitly agreed that the 1926 Act can take its
"content" from history since Chief Justice Burger did engage in a lengthy discussion of the ad-
ministrative policy. See 453 U.S. at 292-301. If there were frequent opportunities for passports to
be revoked on the basis of a likelihood of serious damage to the national security or foreign policy
and the Executive acted inconsistently, then the result reached by the majority in Agee arguably
would have been different. See 453 U.S. at 303. The quotation from Zemel at the beginning of this
footnote thus only applies if there was an administrative practice. The quotation should not be
taken as making administrative practice exclusive, since administrative practice is but one indica-
tion of the underlying administrative policy. See 453 U.S. at 303.
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to be based on the presence of a consistently enforced policy acquiesced in by
congressional silence.'"
In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that Kent and Zernel mandate actual
enforcement of the asserted authority before courts can infer congressional
awareness of and acquiescence in an administrative regulation. 195
 Justice Bren-
nan declared that a requirement of actual enforcement of the asserted authority
was justified as the preference for the strongest possible proof that Congress ac-
quiesced in that authority. t96
 This strong showing of proof was necessary,
reasoned the dissent, because of the presence of sensitive constitutional issues
in a passport revocation situation.'" In addition, Justice Brennan stated that
even if Congress did approve the policy for revocations, a pattern of actual en-
forcements of the asserted power by the Secretary would allow Congress to
register its disapproval of the way the Secretary's policy is implemented. 198
The dissent's insistence on an actual pattern of administrative en-
forcements is problematic for at least five reasons. First, it places government
planning at a disadvantage, since the government would not be able to enforce
regulations enacted in anticipation of future situations. Second, since Congress
is not always assembled and ready to pass legislation, Justice Brennan's inter-
pretation could render the government impotent at a time of an unprecedented
national crisis.' 99
 A third problem is that the revocation of Agee's passport has
heavy foreign policy overtones, and Congress will often allow for broader Ex-
ecutive discretion in foreign policy matters. 20° Fourth, Justice Brennan's
reliance on stronger proof of acquiescence because of the implication of consti-
tutional issues is not warranted. Although a liberty cannot be inhibited without
due process of law, this does not mean that the liberty cannot be inhibited
under any circumstances."' Finally, Brennan's statement that actual enforce-
ment would allow Congress to register its disapproval of the way the
Secretary's policy is implemented is not undermined by Chief Justice Burger's
opinion. Congress is free to remove passport revocations on national security
or foreign policy grounds from the Secretary of State's "discretion.
19S
	 at 300 & 303.
195 Id. at 314 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
196
	 at 315.
197 Id
1 " Id. at 315-16.
199
 Recognition of broader discretion on the part of the Executive when acting in the
area of foreign affairs finds some authority in the decisions of the Court. See First Nat'l City Bank
v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 766-67 (1972) (plurality decision); New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring); Id. at 741 (Marshall,
J., concurring); Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 298 (1944) (war powers); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304, 319-22 (1936). But cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)
(not every case relating to foreign affairs is beyond the reach of the courts).
200 See supra note 199 and cases cited therein.
2°1 Zemel, 381 U.S. at 14.
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2. Determination of a "Substantial and Consistent" Policy
Presupposing that a substantial and consistent policy — and not just
practice — may suffice to show an implied congressional delegation of authori-
ty, the issue becomes how substantial and consistent the administrative policy
must be to imply congressional authorization. Several factors would be rele-
vant to this inquiry. For example, the length of time the policy has been as-
serted is very important. If the policy has been asserted only shortly before the
enactment of legislation putatively demonstrating implied delegation, Con-
gress could well have been unaware of the policy. If, however, the policy has
spanned several generations, elections and political movements, the length of
time is probably adequate.
Another factor in the "substantial and consistent" determination is the
openness of the assertion. If a statute's subsequent legislative history makes it
clear that Congress was aware of a longstanding Executive construction, then
implied authority should be recognized by the courts. In addition, published
proposed rules — which are adequate to give public notice — should be ade-
quate to give Congress notice as well. In fact, if such notice were not adequate,
every agency would bear the burden of having to ask Congress to specifically
accept every rule. This burden would be too great for either the agency or Con-
gress. Furthermore, actual enforcements of a policy which result in litigation
by an aggrieved party, or which result in published administrative opinions,
will add to the claim that the policy asserted is sufficiently open that Congress
should have been aware of it. Finally, the administrative policy must remain
uninterrupted and unchanged through its longstanding and open history. An
interrupted and changing policy is evidence both that the administrative agen-
cy itself is unsure of whether it enjoys the implied congressional authorization
claimed, and that no authorization could exist since Congress would have
received no clear indication of the power asserted. As such it would be im-
proper to imply that Congress acquiesced in any particular policy.
Applying this analysis to Agee, Chief Justice Burger there traced the long-
standing Executive policy of controlling passports on national security and
foreign policy grounds."' According to the Chief Justice, the view that the Ex-
ecutive should be accorded broad discretion in foreign policy was recognized as
early as 1835, 203 if not earlier. 204
 The policy regarding passport denials for na-
tional security reasons was openly asserted, Chief Justice Burger noted, as
evidenced by several opinions of the Attorney General and Executive Orders
published prior to 1926. 205 Indeed, the majority's opinion stated that when
2° 2
 453 U.S. at 292-302.
1" Id. at 292-93 (citing Urtetiqui v. D'Arcy 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692, 699 (1835)).
20' Id. at 294 n.24 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 392-96 (J. Jay) (Mentor ed.
1961)).
202 Id. at 295-96. See supra note 108.
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Congress was legislating in 1926 it was aware of this Executive policy. 208 In ad-
dition, between 1926 and the further legislation in 1978, 202
 the Executive
drafted Executive Orders, 208
 regulations, 208
 instructions to consular officials,li°
notices to passport holders, 2 " and presentations to Congress. 212
 Moreover, in
those situations in which a passport holder's activities abroad could cause
serious damage to the national security or foreign policy of the United States,
the Secretary had consistently used his authority and withheld the passports. 21 s
Finally, this longstanding and open policy was unaltered throughout its ex-
istence. 214
Zoe
	 at 297. See supra note 114.
2" See supra note 41.
2 °8453 U.S. at 298 (citing Exec. Order No. 4800 (1928); Exec, Order No. 5860 (1932);
Exec. Order No. 7856, 3 Fed. Reg. 681 (1938)). "Following the enactment of the 1926 Act,
President Coolidge issued new passport rules in 1928. These required applicants to state the ob-
ject of their trip to each country and furnish proof thereof, and authorized the Secretary to deny
passports in his discretion. President Hoover's Executive Order was identical, and President
Franklin D. Roosevelt's order was substantially the same." Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d at 99
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
209
 453 U.S. at 298-99 (citing 6 Fed. Reg. 5821, 6069-6070, 6349 (1941); 17 Fed. Reg.
8013 (1952); and 21 Fed. Reg. 336 (1956), 22 C.F.R. S 51.136 (1958)). "The regulations are in-
structive. The 1952 version authorized denial of passports to citizens engaged in activities which
would violate laws designed to protect the security of the United States `[i]ri order to promote the
national interest by assuring that the conduct of foreign relations shall be free from unlawful in-
terference.' " Id. at 298-99 (quoting 17 Fed. Reg. 8013 (1952)). "The 1956 amendment of this
regulation provided that passports should be denied for activities 'prejudicial to the orderly con-
duct of foreign' relations; or . . . prejudicial to the interests of the United States.' " Agee v.
Muskie, 629 F.2d at 100 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (quoting 21 Fed. Reg. 336 (1956)). Then
"[i]n 1968 this standard was restated to authorize passport denial for an applicant whose ac-
tivities abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or foreign
policy of the United States." 629 F.2d at 100 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (citing 22 C.F.R.
51. 70(b)(4) (1980)).
2" 453 U.S. at 298 (citing Passport Division Office Instructions of Nov. 1, 1955 (Abstract of
Passport Laws and Precedents, Code No. 7.21)).
211 Id. (citing  Co
 TATE DEPARTMENT PUBLICATION, INFORMATION FOR BEARERS OF
PASSPORTS (eds. of Jan. 1, 1948 through Jan. 15, 1955). In addition, the Passport Office Instruc-
tions of July 30, 1937 gave examples of individuals "who could be denied passports under the
discretionary power of the Secretary. These included . . . 'those who wish to go abroad to take
part in the political or military affairs of foreign countries in ways which would be contrary to the
policy or inimical to the welfare of the United States.' " Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d at 99-100
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (quoting Passport Division Office Instructions ofjuly 30, 1937 (Abstract
of Passport Laws and Precedents, Code No. 7.22)).
2"
 453 U.S. at 299 (citing Proposed Travel Controls: Hearings on S.3423 Before the Subcomm.
to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate
Comm. on the judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1966); Hearings on Right to,Travel: Subcomm, on Con-
stitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, 59-61 (1957); Staff
Report: Reorganization of the Passport Functions of the Department of State Before the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Operations, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1960)). See Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d at 100-101
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting); Note, Passport Revocations, supra note 41, 1184-88.
212 453 U.S. at 302. See Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d at 101 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting)
(court of appeals opinion for Haig v. Agee); Developments in the Law - The National Security Interest
and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1150-51 n.76 (1972); Note, Passport Refusals for
Political Reasons: Constitutional Issues and Judicial Review, 61 YALE L. J. 171, 174-78 (1952).
214 453 U.S. at 292-302.
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3. Justice Brennan's Other Objections
In addition to his insistence that practice and not policy be the guiding
standard to infer congressional authorization, Justice Brennan also stated (1)
that the Agee majority used factors which- the Kent Court deemed irrelevant,"
and (2) that the Executive itself did not believe that it possessed the power
asserted in Agee. 216
a. Irrelevance of Majority's Considerations
Turning to the first point, Justice Brennan stated that Kent deemed irrele-
vant two Attorney General opinions, published in 1869 and 1901, 217 and four
Executive Orders, promulgated between 1907 and 1917." Justice Brennan,
however, misread Kent in insisting that the Kent Court found these items irrele-
vant. Instead, the Kent Court stated that the mere existence of an assertion of
broad discretion is not enough to imply congressional authorization if the exer-
cise of that discretion is inconsistent." The opinions of the Attorney General
and the Executive Orders were simply noted in Kent as examples of assertions
of broad authority. 220 The Kent Court then noted inconsistent exercises of
authority by the Secretary."' Similarly, in Agee the opinions and orders there
noted were meant to document the Executive's longstanding assertion to con-
trol passports on foreign policy grounds. 222 Unlike Kent, however, the Agee
Court did not find evidence of inconsistent exercises of passport authority. 223
b. Executive's Perception of its own Authority
Turning to his argument that the Executive itself did not construe the
passport legislation as giving to it the authority asserted in Agee, 224 Justice
Brennan pointed to two opinions of the Attorney General"' and proposed
legislation on this point. 226 Neither of these Attorney General opinions,
215 Id. at 316-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
216 Id. at 317 n.7.
217 Id. at 316 (citing 23 Op. Att'y Gen. 509, 511 (1901); 13 Op. Att'y Gen'. 89, 92
(1869)).
219 Id. (citing Exec. Order No. 654 (1907); Exec. Order No. 2119-A (1915); Exec.
Order No. 2362-A (1916); Exec. Order No. 2519-A (1917)).
219 See 357 U.S. at 124-25 & nn.10-11. The Kent Court stated, in response to statements
that a longstanding Executive construction should be enough to infer that Congress has adopted
it, that the answer "is in the manner in which the Secretary's discretion was exercised, not in the
bare fact that he had discretion." Id. at 125.
22° See 357 U.S. at 124-25 & nn.10-11.
221 Id. at 128.
222 453 U.S. at 295-96.
223 Id. at 302.
224 Id. at 317 n.7 (Brennan, J,, dissenting).
225 Id. (citing 15 Op. Att'y Gen. 114, 117 (1876); 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 397, 398 (1871)).
226 Id. (citing S. 4110, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. $ 103(6) (1958); Hearings on S. 2770, S. 3998,
S. 4110, and S. 4137 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4 (1958);
H.R. 14895, § 205(e), 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)).
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however, supports Justice Brennan's concern that the Executive did not believe
itself to be vested with broad discretion in this area. The first opinion — from
1876 — stated only that there should be no distinction between native born or
naturalized citizens. 227
 That opinion did not concern the Executive's discretion
in foreign policy. In the second opinion — from 1871 — the Attorney General
was concerned solely with which citizens of the former independent Republic of
Texas were to be considered citizens of the United States and thus entitled to
passports. 228
 That opinion, as well, did not consider whether the government
can control passports on national security or foreign policy grounds.
Justice Brennan's notation of the Executive's attempt to secure legislation
clearly granting it the authority asserted in Agee does not suggest that the Ex-
ecutive did not think it had this authority. The seeking of the legislation does
not imply, in one direction or the other, whether the Executive had the authori-
ty asserted in Agee. 229
 Indeed, in seeking the legislation the Executive may only
have wished to have the Kent holding clarified.
In summary, the majority stayed within Court precedent — as clarified in
Agee — when it held that a substantial and consistent administrative construc-
tion would be sufficient to find implied congressional authority. In addition,
Justice Brennan's public policy arguments in favor of an administrative prac-
tice are not stronger than those which favor an administrative construction as
sufficient. The issue which will face future courts will be whether the particular
administrative policy being challenged is sufficiently "substantial and consist-
ent." Presumably, the tracing of the parameters of that standard must, after
Agee, await a case-by-case determination. Finally, Justice Brennan's two other
arguments in dissent — the use of factors in Agee which Kent found
"irrelevant" and the Executive not believing that it had the authority asserted
in Agee — do not bear up under close scrutiny.
B. Constitutional Implications of Haig v. Agee
Finding an implied congressional delegation of the authority to deny or
revoke passports on national security or foreign policy grounds, the Agee Court
moved on to consider the constitutional implications of this authority. 230
 As an
alternative to his non-delegation argument, Agee claimed that the regulation,
even if authorized, was invalid on its face in light of the first and fifth amend-
ments. Agee claimed his freedom to travel, freedom to speak and right to a
7" 15 Op. Att'y Gen. at 117. This opinion stated that the laws of the United States
authorize the issue of passports "to all citizens, without distinction, whether native born or
naturalized. . . " Id.
725
 13 Op. Att'y Gen. at 398. This opinion stated that those persons who satisfied cer-
tain prerequisites based on their alleged citizenship in Texas at the time of annexation, "were
citizens of the United States, and [were) entitled to passports as such." Id.
225 See United States v. Board of Comm'rs of Sheffield, 435 U.S. 110, 135 (1978); Agee
v. Muskie, 629 F.2d at 85; Note, Passport Revocations, supra note 41, at 1187-88.
220 453 U.S. at 306.
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hearing before being deprived of a liberty had been abridged.
First, Agee's fifth amendment freedom of travel"' was not unconstitu-
tionally curtailed by the passport revocation, because such governmental ac-
tion is subject only to a requirement of reasonableness. As the Agee Court
pointed out, the freedom to travel abroad is distinguishable from the right to in-
terstate trave1. 232
 Unlike restrictions on interstate travel, therefore, passport
revocations are subject to reasonable governmental regulation. 233 As the Zemel
Court noted, "the fact that a liberty cannot be inhibited without due process of
law does not mean that it can under no circumstances be inhibited.,, 234
 Na-
tional security is a compelling interest of the United States. 235
 When the
government is confronted with a choice between controlling a citizen's passport
or ignoring the needs of the national security or foreign policy, the government
should be able to restrict a citizen's freedom of international movement. 236
Nor is such restriction of international travel in tension with Supreme
Court precedent. In Aptheker v. Secretary of State,'" the Court did strike down
section six of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950238 on the ground
that it impermissibly infringed upon international trave1. 238 The legislation in
Aptheker, however, is distinguishable from that in Agee. The legislation in Ap-
theker made it criminal for anyone affiliated with a Communist organization to
obtain a passport. 24° Since the statute ignored such relevant criteria as the in-
2." The freedom of travel "is a personal right included within the word 'liberty' as used
in the Fifth Amendment." Kent, 357 U.S. at 129. Justice Douglas has suggested that travel was
also protected under the first amendment. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 23-24 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
232 453 U.S. at 306.
233 Id. One commentator has expressed the fear that passport revocations for political
purposes without regard to civil liberties is reminiscent of totalitarian governments. Comment,
Passport Refusals for Political Reasons: Constitutional Issues and Judicial Review, 61 YALE L. J. 171,
202-03 (1952). Agee still requires at least a standard of reasonableness although the Court may
look for a higher standard if the denial or revocation of the passport was in tension with the first
amendment. Compare Califano v. Aznavorian, supra note 156.
234 381 U.S. at 14.
"5 See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (per curiam).
236 See SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY PASSPORT PROCEDURES OF THE ASSOCIATION
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FREEDOM TO TRAVEL 58-62 (1958) (passports could
be withheld upon a showing of danger to the national security).
2" 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
238 Id. at 505.
239 Id.
248 Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 6, 64 Stat. 987, 993 (codified
at 50 U.S.C. $ 785 (1958)). This statute read in relevant part:
When a Communist organization as defined in paragraph (5) of section 3 of this title
is registered, or there is in effect a final order of the Board requiring such organiza-
tion to register, it shall be unlawful for any member of such organization, with
knowledge or notice that such organization is so registered or that such order has
become final —
(1) to make application for a passport, or the renewal of a passport, to be issued or
renewed by or under the authority of the United States; or
(2) to use or attempt to use any such passport.
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dividual's knowledge of membership in a Communist organization, 2" degree
of activity in and commitment to the organization,'" and purposes in and
places for trave1, 2" the Court found that the statute too broadly and in-
discriminately restricted the freedom to trave1. 2" The Aptheker Court, however,
did recognize that Congress can act to protect the national security.'" The Ap-
theker Court declared that a statute which is intended to protect the national
security must not sweep too broadly and must be the least drastic alternative if
the statute is to infringe on individual liberties.
In Agee, the challenged regulations do not, on their face, create any ir-
rebuttable presumptions concerning an individual's beliefs or associations.'"
The clear language of the regulations at issue in Agee only allow curtailment of
a citizen's right to a passport in the case of serious damage to national security
or foreign policy of the United States.'" Every aggrieved individual is free to
rebut, in the administrative hearing granted, any allegation that he or she is a
threat to the national security or foreign policy of the United States. 248
 In addi-
tion, restricting an individual's travel for the protection of national security
may very well be the only avenue open to the government. 249
 Therefore, the
challenged regulations are facially constitutional despite infringement on the
freedom of travel abroad.
Looking at Agee's claim to protection under the first amendment, there
are two grounds upon which the Court was able to dismiss the claim, assuming
arguendo that first amendment rights extended outside of the United States. 25 °
Burger stated that since Agee's disclosures were intended to disrupt the foreign
intelligence operations and the recruitment of intelligence personnel of the •
United States, those disclosures were not protected. 25 ' Justice Brennan took ex-
ception to this declaration by the majority, stating that Agee's concession was
only to attack the validity of the regulations on their face and not their applica-
241
 378 U.S. at 509-10.
2"
 Id. at 510-11.
243 Id. at 511-12.
244
 Id. at 505.
245 Id. at 509.
246 See supra note 26.
247 Id.
2"
 The procedure for the post-revocation hearing is reprinted at 22 C.F.R. §§
51.80-51.89 (1980).
243
 453 U.S. at 308. Although Agee argued that the government should be limited to an
injunction ordering him to comply with his secrecy agreement with the CIA, Agee conceded that
such an injunction would not be enforceable outside of the United States. Id. at n.60.
250 Id. at 308-09. Chief justice Burger also stated that he agreed with the district court's
holding that Agee lacked standing to argue overbreadth and vagueness. Id. at 309 n.61. The
district court, however, did not hold that Agee lacked standing to argue overbreadth and
vagueness. See supra note 34. The district court hearing, in fact, indirectly addressed only the
overbreadth argument and Agee reserved that argument for future consideration. Id. Both the
overbreadth and vagueness arguments should be viewed as reserved for future consideration.
251
 453 U.S. at 308-09 (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)). See supra
note 165.
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tion to him. 252 Nonetheless, the Agee majority can be understood as stating that
the regulations on their face do not offend the first amendment since the
language of the regulations is limited to cases of serious damage to the national
security or foreign policy of the United States. A prior decision of the Court
does allow for prior restraint in case of a national emergency. 2 " Since a threat
of serious damage to national security is very similar to a national emergency,
an individual's first amendment right in relation to his passport would be
outweighed by the government's interest when the revocation is based on the
likelihood of serious damage to the national security.
In addition to Chief Justice Burger's statement that Agee's disclosures
were not protected .by the first amendment because they were statements likely
to cause serious damage to the national security, the Chief Justice also
expressed the view that what was inhibited was not Agee's speech, but his ac-
tions. 254 Since Zemel held that an unrestrained desire to gather information
abroad is not protected by the first amendment, 255 the challenged regulations
in Agee are not unconstitutional on their face on the grounds that they thwart
information gathering. A revocation of a passport, however, can restrain the
desire of a citizen to speak in another nation. This contention was not before
the Zemel Court. 256 The Agee Court in its general holding that the revocation of
Philip Agee's passport does not inhibit speech apparently must be understood
as adding to the holding in Zemel. Thus, just as the desire for unrestrained in-
formation gathering abroad is not protected by the first amendment, neither
would the unrestrained desire to speak in other nations be protected by the first
amendment."'
Agee's claim that he was entitled to a prerevocation hearing was also cor-
rectly rejected by the Court. 256 Since a letter was sent which included the
reasons for the revocation, 259 and the State Department's regulations included
252
	 at 321 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"' Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). See supra note 165. There is some
doubt, however, as to the extent oithe Near holding. See Knoll, National Security: The Ultimate
Threat to the First Amendment, 66 MINN. L. REV. 161 (1981).
254 453 U.S. at 309 (citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965)). Justice Brennan
stated that under the majority's analysis, a prisoner serving a forty year sentence for criticizing
the federal food stamp policy would not have had his freedom of speech infringed since he re-
mains free to criticize the federal government, although from a cell. Id. at 320 n.10 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
255
	
U.Sat 16.
256 Id. The appellant's contention in Zemel was solely that the travel ban to Cuba was
direct interference with the individual's first amendment right to travel abroad to obtain first
hand observations of the effect of the policies of the United States and of the conditions abroad
which could affect those policies. Id.
257 Both the desire to gather information and that of unrestrained speaking in other na-
tions are factors to be considered when a determination is made whether the individual had been
denied due process of law. See Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16 (citing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126-27
(1958)). See also infra notes 258-66.
255 453 U.S. at 309.
279 See supra note 24.
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a method for a prompt postrevocation hearing, 26° the Agee Court held that ade-
quate deference was given to procedural due process. 2 " The Agee Court's treat-
ment of this issue finds support in the Court's prior holding in Matthews v.
Eldridge. 262 The Eldridge Court found that due process requires that an oppor-
tunity to be heard must be afforded " 'at a meaningful time and in a mean-
ingful manner,' "263
 and " 'for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.' "264 The Eldridge Court articulated three factors to be
balanced before a citizen's rights may be infringed without a pretermination
evidentiary hearing: the actual interest affected by government action; any risk
of wrongful taking and the additional standards thereby necessitated; and the
government's interest. 265
 Since the interest which would be deprived would be
the use of a passport up until the time of the postrevocation hearing, since the
regulations require notice of the reasons for the revocation, and since the na-
tional security and foreign policy are very important interests of the govern-
ment, the Eldridge balancing test appears to be satisfied in regard to the regula-
tions challenged in Agee. 266
 Other regulations provide for a full postrevocation
hearing.'"
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Agee held that a substantial and consistent ad-
ministrative policy will be sufficient to imply congressional authorization under
the Passport Act of 1926. The Agee holding therefore rejects any interpretation
of the Court's prior holdings in Kent and Zemel requiring the existence of an ad-
ministrative practice to impute authorization. In future challenges to the
validity of regulations promulgated under the Passport Act of 1926, courts will
be asked to determine whether the policy asserted is indeed substantial and
consistent. Factors courts should consider in this inquiry include the length of
time the policy has been asserted, the openness of the assertion of power and
the unchanging nature of the policy. With respect to the first and fifth amend-
ment claims, the Agee majority was correct in finding the challenged regulations
facially valid. The regulations could only be used if there was a likelihood of
serious damage to the national security or foreign policy, and therefore escape
constitutional infirmity. Finally, the Supreme Court in Agee was not confronted
26° Set 22 C.F.R. S 51.80.51.89 (1980).
261 453 U.S. at 309-10.
262
 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Eldridge concerned the termination of disability benefits which
were being awarded under the 1956 amendments to Title II of the Social Security Act. Id. at
323-24.
265 Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
264
	 at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
265 See 424 U.S. at 335.
266
 The challenge was to the facial validity of the regulations and thus no factual deter-
mination of "serious damage" was made.
267 22 C.F.R. SS 51.80-51.89 (1980).
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with established facts of an individual's action. Therefore, the future plaintiff
may be able to succeed, by using the administrative procedures available to
him, in showing that his conduct was not likely to cause serious damage to the
national security or foreign policy. In addition, the future plaintiff may wish to
challenge regulations on the basis of overbreadth and vagueness. 268
GREGORY LIMONCELLI
468 See supra notes 167 & 250.
